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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy. Statutes of the type found in the instant case' are
subject to the criticism that, standing alone, they fail to give protec-
tion to the judgment creditor who has already been injured. North
Dakota meets this situation by allowing recourse to an unsatisfied
judgment fund when the judgment debtor has no resources with
which to pay, and the judgment is more than $300.00 and less than
$10,000.00.' Massachusetts has met the situation by requiring com-
pulsory liability insurance of all drivers.9 This method, however, is
open to the objection that it amounts to a subsidization of insurance
companies or represents an instance of the state itself going into the
insurance business. Nevertheless, it would appear that the require-
ment of compulsory liability insurance offers greater protection, at
least in the case of residents of the state, than an unsatisfied judg-
ment fund, since there is no minimum amount which is not covered.
Veloyce G. Winslow.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER OF MUNICIPALITY-
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE DECLARING DOOR-TO-DOOR SOLI-
CITING A NUISANCE-Appellant, representing a national magazine
subscription company in charge of a crew of solicitors, was sentenced
and fined by appellee city for violation of a city ordinance declaring
that the going in and upon private residences within the city by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors
of merchandise without request or invitation, for the soliciting of
orders or sale or disposal of their merchandise to be a misdemeanor
and punishable as such. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
conviction and fine, whereupon appellant attacked the constitution-
ality of the ordinance in the United States Supreme Court. In finding
the ordinance constitutional, over two dissents, the court held that it
was not violative of due process, commerce clause or freedom of
speech and press. While admitting that the knocker on the door is
an invitation or license to attempt an entry, the court decided that
frequent visits become a nuisance. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 71
S.Ct. 920 (1951).
Here involved is the ordinance commonly known in both lay and
legal circles as the Green River ordinance because of its origin in
Green River, Wyoming, in 1931. Its widespread adoption has produced
a sharp conflict between the local police power and persons engaged
in businesses which go directly to the prospective customer in his
home. It represents a phase of the municipal police power which
concededly is justified insofar as it relates to public health, morals,
N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-16 (Supp. 1949).
S N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-17 (Supp. 1949).
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90 (Tercent. ed. 1932).
RECENT CASES
safety, welfare and convenience.' However, the relation must be
reasonable,' not arbitrary or discriminatory.' Local law can regulate
the use of streets' and sidewalks' and prohibit their use altogether
for purposes of sales or solicitation where the geographical classifi-
cation is reasonable.' House to house peddling, soliciting and can-
vassing too are subject to reasonable police regulation and licensing.'
Heretofore, authorities have split upon the constitutionality of
the Green River ordinance. It has been upheld in its state of origin,'
federal circuit court,' and a few other states." It has been declared
unconstitutional in many state courts." The bases of the decisions
adverse to the ordinance are that it is discriminatory" and violative
of due process." The recent United States -Supreme Court decision in
the instant case brushed these decisions aside with little regard for
the cogent reasoning contained in them. While the majority considers
this ordinance to be merely regulatory, the dissent of Chief Justice
Vinson more realistically recognized it as a flat prohibition of solicita-
tion, a fact admitted by the supreme court of Louisiana' when this
case was before it. The dissent also points out that the United States
Supreme Court regards the solicitation of orders for goods produced
in another state to be interstate commerce as much as the transpor-
tation of those goods." To reconcile the present decision with this
reaffirmed " view is difficult at best. Federal courts ordinarily look
critically at statutes or ordinances which tend to discriminate against
interstate commerce," and unhesitatingly strike down those which
do." Despite the commendable purpose professed for the ordinance,
and apparent absence of discrimination on its face, there is undeniably
discrimination in fact.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 24. 322 (3rd ed. 1949).
Ex parte Baker, 127 Tex. Crim. 589, 78 S.W.2d 610 (1934).
Russo v. Morgan, 174 Misc. 1013, 21 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1940).
4 People's Transit Co. v. Henshaw, 20 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied
275 U.S. 553 (1927).
Wade v. City and County of San Francisco, 82 Cal. App.2d 337, 186 P.2d
181 (1947).
Pittsford v. Los Angeles, 50 Cal. App.2d 25, 122 P.2d 535 (1942); Com-
monwealth v. Ellis, 158 Mass. 555, 33 N.E. 651 (1893). But cf. City of
Buffalo v. Linsman, 113 App. Div. 584, 98 NY. Supp. 737 (4th Dep't.
1906).
Ex parte Hartmann, 25 Cal. App.2d 55, 76 P.2d 709 (1938); People v.
Passafume, 22 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1940).
Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936).
" Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933),
rev'g Fuller Brush Co. v. Town of Green River, 60 F.2d 613 (D. Wyo.
1932).
E.g. McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939);
Green v. Town of Gallup, 46 N.M. 71, 120 P.2d 619 (1941).
" E.g. Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); Jewel Tea Co. v.
City of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W. 664 (1940); City of Qrange,
burg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (1936).
12 Whipple v. City of South Milwaukee, 218 Wis. 395, 261 N.W. 235
(1935); White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S.E.2d 269 (1939).13 Myers v. City of Defiance, 67 Ohio App. 159, 36 N.E.2d 162 (1940).
14 City of Alexandria v. Breard, 217 La. 820, 827, 47 So.2d 553, 556
(1950).
See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887).
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
" Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
" Ibid.
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In the instant case there is also involved, but not discussed, the
issue as to whether a municipality can transform by ordinance that
which has always been a legitimate business into a public nuisance."Such an extension of the general concept of what constitutes a public
nuisance7 could easily be considered unwarranted, even though thepolice power extends beyond morals, health and safety to encompassprotection to the well-being and tranquility of the community.n The
nuisance here, if an actual nuisance, tends to be private rather thanpublic." As such it is not subject to abatement by the municipality
through a criminal ordinance.' It seems harsh to make criminal, by
failure to strictly construe a penal statute,' the proscribed conduct
which has always been a legitimate business.
The finality of federal decisions on constitutional issues would
seem to place the future of the transient business man squarely in thehands of the local lawmakers, often composed of, or dominated orinfluenced by local business men. However, the impact of this recent
decision may not be as broad or severe as it appears to be. State
courts have declared this ordinance invalid on the grounds that muni-
cipalities have only delegated powers;' nuisances are defined only by
common law or statute;' that the municipality was unauthorized to
make it unlawful to carry on a lawful trade in a lawful manner," or
that such ordinances were unwarranted." In these states the consti-
tutional arguments are unnecessary and federal jurisdiction can be
avoided. Where state courts uphold the ordinance the only satis-factory solution would appear to be legislation protecting house-holders who indicate a desire not to be disturbed, but allowing those
who have no objection to be solicited in their homes.
Frank J. Kosanda
19 To the effect that it cannot, see City of Osceola v. Blair, 231 Iowa 770, 2
N.W.2d 83 (1942); N.J. Good Humor v. Board of Com'rs., 124 N.J.L.
162, 11 A.2d 113 (1940).
2 State v. Lee, 203 S.C. 536, 28 S.E.2d 402 (1943) (nuisance is public ifit occurs in a public place, or where the public frequently congregates, or
where members of the public are likely to come within the range of its in-
fluence, or if injury and annoyance are occasioned to such part of the pub-
lic as comes in contact with it).
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (involved prohibited use of
sound truck).
Moon v. Clark, 192 Ga. 47, 14 S.E.2d 481 (1941) (A public nuisance
damages all persons who come within the sphere of its operation).
See Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); 2 Dillon,
Munic. Corp. § 684 (5th ed. 1911).
24 Water, Light 6 Gas Co. v. Hutchinson, 207 U.S. 385 (1907) (Grants to
municipal corporations, like grants to private corporations, are subject to
the rule of strict construction).
Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 At. 417 (1937).
State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297 (1884); City of McAlester v. Grand Union Tea
Co., 186 Okla. 487, 98 P.2d 924 (1940).
De Berry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940).
' White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S.E.2d 269 (1939).
